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ABSTRACT
2018 marks the twentieth anniversary of the Latimer House ‘process’ which 
commenced with the drafting of the Latimer House Guidelines for the Common-
wealth on Good Practice Governing Relations between the Executive, Parliament 
and the Judiciary. Since then the Latimer House Guidelines have been trans-
formed into the Commonwealth Principles (Latimer House) on the Relationship 
between the Three Branches of Government which have been endorsed by 
Commonwealth Heads of Government on several occasions. 
This article assesses the role of the Latimer House process over the last two 
decades against the background of the Commonwealth’s evolving commitments to 
good governance and the rule of law. Part 1 explores the role of the Commonwealth 
in supporting good governance and the rule of law whilst Part 2 considers and 
evaluates the Latimer House process itself. Part 3 reviews the development of the 
Commonwealth Principles in practice whilst in Part 4 some specific implementation 
issues concerning the judiciary are discussed. Part 5 considers the future development 
of the Commonwealth Principles whilst Part 6 provides a conclusion and overview. 
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INTRODUCTION
2018 marks the twentieth anniversary of the Latimer House ‘process’ which 
commenced with the drafting of the Latimer House Guidelines for the Common-
wealth on Good Practice Governing Relations between the Executive, Parliament 
and the Judiciary. Since then the Latimer House Guidelines have been trans-
formed into the Commonwealth Principles (Latimer House) on the Relationship 
between the Three Branches of Government which, as noted below, have been 
endorsed by Commonwealth Heads of Government on several occasions. 
This article assesses the role of the Latimer House process over the last two 
decades against the background of the Commonwealth’s evolving commitments to 
good governance and the rule of law. Part 1 explores the role of the Commonwealth 
in supporting good governance and the rule of law whilst Part 2 considers and 
evaluates the Latimer House process itself. Part 3 reviews the development of the 
Commonwealth Principles in practice whilst in Part 4 some specific implementation 
issues concerning the judiciary are discussed. Part 5 considers the future 
development of the Commonwealth Principles whilst Part 6 provides a conclusion 
and overview. 
PART 1. THE COMMONWEALTH, GOOD GOVERNANCE 
AND THE RULE OF LAW
The Commonwealth is a voluntary association of fifty-three independent and 
equal sovereign states that uniquely is not formed by a binding treaty such as that 
established through membership of the United Nations. Consensus has been at the 
heart of the Commonwealth association ever since, but the nature of that consen-
sus has evolved since 1950 in both scope and complexity.
In 1949, the governments of the then eight members of what was still styled at 
the beginning as the ‘British Commonwealth of Nations’ adopted the Declaration 
of London, identified by Sir William Dale as the ‘foundation document of the 
modern Commonwealth’.1 The Declaration was primarily concerned with the 
1 The text is found in Sir William Dale, The Modern Commonwealth (Butterworths 1983) 39.
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ingenious formula whereby India could remain a member of the (no longer British) 
Commonwealth after becoming a republic on the basis of the acceptance of the 
British King as ‘a symbol of the free association of its independent member nations 
and as such Head of the Commonwealth’. The principles guiding this re-branded 
association were alluded to in the vaguest terms: members declared that they 
remained ‘united as free and equal members of the Commonwealth of Nations, 
freely co-operating in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress’ [our italics]. 
From 1949 until 1969, regular meetings of Commonwealth ‘Prime Ministers’ 
(28 heads of government by 1969) issued increasingly lengthy communiqués 
dealing with matters of common concern such as the Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) 
crisis, the Middle East, trade, aid and development. The communiqués contained 
no general statement of principles, though it could be discerned that the 
Commonwealth consensus embraced notions of democratic governance, 
international co-operation, peaceful settlement of disputes and the promotion of 
economic development. More particularly, the 1964 communiqué referred to race 
relations and the need for each member country to build a structure of society 
‘which offers equal opportunity and non-discrimination for all its people, 
irrespective of race, colour or creed’.2
In 1971, at their meeting in Singapore, Commonwealth Heads of Governments 
(the designation replacing that of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, given that a 
number of members now had executive presidents) took the significant step of 
adopting a Declaration of Commonwealth Principles. This included a clear 
commitment to democratic political processes:
We believe in the liberty of the individual, in equal rights for all citizens 
regardless of race, colour, creed or political belief, and in their inalienable 
right to participate by means of free and democratic political processes in 
framing the society in which they live. We therefore strive to promote in each 
of our countries those representative institutions and guarantees for personal 
freedom under the law that are our common heritage.3
Two subsequent declarations in 1977 and 1979 were concerned with addressing 
apartheid in sport and the elimination of racism and racial prejudice. However in 
1991, Heads of Government adopted the Harare Commonwealth Declaration as a 
more detailed statement of the fundamental Principles set out at Singapore, with a 
2 Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 1964, Final Communiqué, The 
Commonwealth at the Summit, Commonwealth Secretariat, (1987) 83.
3 Ibid 156–57.
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commitment to the protection and promotion of the fundamental political values 
of the Commonwealth, i.e:
• Democracy, democratic processes and institutions which reflect national 
circumstances, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, just and 
honest government;
• Fundamental human rights, including equal rights and opportunities for all 
citizens regardless of race, colour, creed or political belief.4
Heads of Government also pledged themselves to work, inter alia, for equality for 
women, ‘so that they may exercise their full and equal rights’.
These references to the rule of law, democratic processes, fundamental human 
rights and equality for women provided the inspiration for the future Latimer 
House process. The Harare Declaration contained no provisions for enforcement 
or compliance monitoring. However, at their Meeting in Auckland in 1995, Heads 
of Government adopted The Millbrook Action Programme on the Harare 
Declaration.5 This established the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group 
(CMAG) on the Harare Declaration ‘in order to deal with serious and persistent 
violations’ of the principles contained in that Declaration, in particular in the event 
of the overthrow of a democratically elected government. CMAG’s task was to 
recommend measures to restore democracy and constitutional rule, including as a 
last resort suspension from membership of the association. It may be thought that 
because of its nature as a voluntary association of nations, the Commonwealth 
might not have effective power to persuade individual countries to conform to its 
principles. Certainly some ‘suspended’ countries have flirted or threatened to join 
other international entities, for example Nigeria joined the Francophonie after it 
was suspended from the Commonwealth in 1995. However, with the exception of 
Zimbabwe and the Maldives which, when threatened with the process, chose to 
leave the Commonwealth, the historic ties of member nations has provided a 
driving force behind compliance with the requests from the Commonwealth in 
regard to the re-establishment of democratic processes in The Gambia, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Fiji Islands and the Solomon Islands.6
4 Commonwealth Statement on Apartheid in Sport (the Gleneagles Agreement) (1977); 
Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers (n 3) 198; Lusaka Declaration of the 
Commonwealth on Racism and Racial Prejudice (1979); Meeting of Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers (n 3) 217; Harare Commonwealth Declaration vol 2, p 82.
5 Harare Commonwealth Declaration vol 2, p 156.
6 In 2018, Zimbabwe applied to re-join the Commonwealth.
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2. THE LATIMER HOUSE PROCESS
The Harare Declaration invited the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and 
non-governmental Commonwealth organisations to play their full part in the promo-
tion of the objectives of the Declaration. At a meeting of Commonwealth Law 
Ministers in 1996, the importance of the role played by judges and lawyers in a 
‘healthy democracy’ was recognised.7 It was against this background that four 
Commonwealth associations, namely the Commonwealth Parliamentary Associa-
tion (CPA), Commonwealth Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association (CMJA), 
Commonwealth Lawyers Association (CLA) and Commonwealth Legal Education 
Association (CLEA) came together in a Joint Colloquium in 1998 at Latimer House, 
a country house conference centre in Buckinghamshire in the United Kingdom. 
They were supported in their endeavours by the Commonwealth Secretariat, the 
Commonwealth Foundation and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
The Colloquium brought together for the first time a senior-level group of over 
fifty participants from twenty-three jurisdictions, including parliamentarians, some 
holding ministerial office, judges, legal practitioners and legal academicians, to adopt 
a Commonwealth Model on ‘Parliamentary Supremacy and Judicial Independence’. 
The object was not only the promotion of dialogue between those at the cutting edge 
of good governance issues. The Colloquium had the specific aim of drafting detailed 
guidelines as to best practice with regard to relations between the executive, parliament 
and the judiciary in the promotion of good governance, the rule of law and human 
rights to ensure the effective implementation of the Harare Principles. The Latimer 
House Guidelines on Parliamentary Supremacy and Judicial Independence (the 
Guidelines) which emerged from the deliberations and were adopted by consensus, 
were intended as an operational manual of good practice rather than yet another high-
sounding declaration of principle (of which the Commonwealth was proving itself 
only too adept). As recalled at the beginning of this article, it is now twenty years 
since the drafting of the Guidelines, an initiative, it should be stressed, of the four 
partner organisations, not of Commonwealth governments.
The Preamble to the Guidelines recited the fundamental political values of the 
Commonwealth quoted above from the Harare Declaration.8 From these values 
7 Communiqué of the Meeting of Commonwealth Law Ministers 1996.
8 The full text of the Guidelines and subsequent documentation, including the Principles 
(see below) are conveniently set out in a booklet published by the four sponsoring 
organisations <https://www.cmja.org/downloads/latimerhouse/commprinthreearms.pdf> 
accessed 20 November 2018. A full account of the Latimer House deliberations can be 
found in John Hatchard and Peter Slinn (eds) Parliamentary Supremacy and Judicial 
Independence: A Commonwealth Approach (Cavendish Publishing Ltd 1999).
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the Guidelines adopted the principle that, in terms of the relationship between 
executive, parliament and the judiciary, each ‘institution must exercise 
responsibility and restraint in the exercise of power within its own constitutional 
sphere so as not to encroach on the legitimate discharge of constitutional functions 
by the other institutions’. In essence, the doctrine of separation of powers was 
imported into the fundamental values of the Commonwealth. 
The document then set out in some detail guidelines concerning the relationship 
between Parliament and the judiciary, the independence of judges and parliamentarians, 
the role of women in parliament, judicial and parliamentary ethics, accountability 
mechanisms, the law-making process, the role of non-judicial and non-parliamentary 
institutions, and measures for implementation and monitoring compliance with the 
Guidelines. The Guidelines also dealt with a number of controversial issues, such as 
the expulsion of members of Parliament for ‘floor-crossing’, gender balance in 
parliament and the appointment, discipline and removal of judges. 
The Guidelines attracted wide notice throughout the Commonwealth and their 
adoption was the beginning of a ‘Latimer House process’ which continues to this 
day. This process was fostered by the determined advocacy of the four sponsoring 
organisations through what were styled the ‘red channel’ (via Commonwealth 
governments and governmental institutions) and the ‘green channel’ (via independent 
non-governmental organisations and activities). These channels were interrelated in 
the sense that the partner organisations recognised that, if the Guidelines were to be 
implemented effectively, they would require endorsement by Commonwealth 
governments. On the other hand the partner organisations needed to retain freedom 
to hold governmental agencies to account for perceived breaches of the Guidelines. 
The Commonwealth legal community were made aware of the Guidelines through 
publicity at conferences of lawyers, legal educators and parliamentarians sponsored 
by the partner organisations, so that, for example, references to the Guidelines began 
to appear in judicial pronouncements.9
9 In September 1999, the Chief Justice of Trinidad and Tobago referred to the Guidelines in 
his Opening of the Legal Year Speech in publicly expressing concern over a perceived threat 
to the independence of the judiciary in his jurisdiction: see <http://webopac.ttlawcourts.org/
LawTermOpen/1999.pdf> accessed 20 November 2018. In the same year, the Guidelines 
were cited for the first time in a Commonwealth Court. The High Court of Judiciary in 
Scotland referred to the Guidelines in holding that a temporary sheriff appointed on an 
annual renewal basis by the executive did not constitute an independent and impartial 
tribunal as required by the fair trial provisions of the European Convention on Human 
Rights: Starrs v Procurator Fiscal (Linlithgow) [2000] 1 LRC 718, 737 and 765. Subsequent 
citations of the Guidelines/Principles from around the Commonwealth include that of the 
Chief Justice of Tonga in Tu’ifua v Public Service Tribunal [2014] 5 LRC 588, [15].
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Remarkable progress was made through the ‘red channel’. Beginning in 1999, 
representatives of the partner organisations were invited to participate in a lengthy 
process of consultation at Commonwealth official and ministerial level leading to 
the formation of a Joint Working Party of Ministers and representatives of the four 
partner organisations. This resulted in a ‘refinement’ of the Guidelines into the 
Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles on the Accountability of and 
Relationship between the Three Branches of Government (The Commonwealth 
Principles). Commonwealth Heads of Government at their meeting at Abuja, 
Nigeria, in December 2003:
…[E]ndorsed the recommendation of their Law Ministers on Commonwealth 
Principles on the accountability of and relationship between the three branches 
of government. They acknowledged that judicial independence and delivery of 
efficient justice services were important for maintaining the balance of power 
between the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary.10
At their next meeting in Malta in 2005, Heads of Government:
…[N]oted that the Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles … 2003, which 
recognised the importance of a balance of power between the Executive, 
Legislature and Judiciary, constitute an integral part of the Commonwealth’s 
fundamental political values as set out in the Harare Declaration’(emphasis 
added).11
This was affirmed at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in 
London in 2018. 
3. THE COMMONWEALTH PRINCIPLES: STATUS 
AND ENFORCEMENT
What had begun as a set of Guidelines drafted at an unofficial gathering of lawyers, 
legal academics, politicians and judicial officers from around the Commonwealth 
had now emerged, through a process of consultation in which the unofficial part-
ners had played a full part, as a set of Principles accepted by all Commonwealth 
member states as ‘an integral part’ of their fundamental political values. As 
Richard Bourne, a leading commentator on Commonwealth affairs, has observed:
10 Abuja Communiqué, para 8, The Commonwealth at the Summit, vol 3 (Commonwealth 
Secretariat 1997) 131.
11 Malta Communiqué, para 8; Abuja Communiqué (n 10) 172.
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At the Abuja CHOGM, leaders not only approved [the Commonwealth 
Principles] but, in an unprecedented move, attached them to the 1991 
Commonwealth Harare Declaration. This was a spectacular example of the 
impact of the Commonwealth associations on intergovernmental policy, even 
though practice in countries as varied as Pakistan and Uganda has failed to 
live up to it.12
Bourne has identified several crucial elements of the Latimer House process 
which should be of general interest to all lawyers concerned with public law in 
both domestic and international spheres, namely the role of Commonwealth 
associations in shaping the development of the fundamental values of the 
Commonwealth, the legal status of such Principles and the problem of compliance.
i) The role of the Commonwealth associations in shaping the 
intergovernmental organisation’s fundamental values
An examination of the Latimer House process suggests that the Commonwealth 
has evolved a system whereby organisations independent of government can play a 
full part in the development of principles which governments may endorse. Of 
course there is nothing new about recognising the influence of civil society on 
international policy-making as is witnessed in the environmental sphere. However, 
the devising of the Commonwealth Principles represents a significant example of 
cooperation between ministers, their officials and the Commonwealth Secretariat 
on the one hand, and the partner organisations on the other, thus overcoming the 
suspicion with which ministers and officials often regard ‘civil society’ groups 
which may be perceived as attempting to insert themselves into decision-making 
processes which are the sole prerogative of elected governments.
ii) The legal status of the Commonwealth Principles 
The reference in the Malta Communiqué is to the Principles as being part of the 
fundamental political values of the Commonwealth. Does this mean that the 
Harare Declaration and other instruments emerging from the CHOGMs are 
merely statements of political intent and of no legal or normative effect? 
The legal significance of Commonwealth Declarations was analysed some 
thirty-five years ago by Sir William Dale in his seminal work The Modern 
12 Richard Bourne, ‘The Commonwealth and Civil Society’ in James Mayal (ed.) The 
Contemporary Commonwealth: An Assessment 1965–2009 (Routledge 2010) 128.
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Commonwealth.13 As noted earlier, Commonwealth member states are not 
mutually bound by agreements binding in international law so as to attract 
registration under Article 102 of the United Nations Charter. However, Dale 
concluded:
The Commonwealth Declarations emanate, as do the United Nations 
Declarations, from an organised body, the Heads of Government Meeting, a 
principal organ of the Commonwealth Association… The Heads of 
Government are able to ensure –subject to the requirements of their domestic 
Constitutions – that [the commitments contained in the Declarations] are 
carried out…. The instruments may also, as evidence of state practice, 
contribute to customary international law.14
The issue has been further explored, in the light of developments since 1983, 
by one of the present writers who argues that, at the very least, Commonwealth 
Declarations fit comfortably into the character of ‘soft law’. Non-binding legal 
instruments may involve commitments in good faith which are expected to have 
normative significance for the way states behave.15 Commonwealth Declarations 
in relation to human rights, the rule of law, gender equality and good governance, 
as particularly reflected in the Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles, thus 
reinforce the development of international law and processes whereby:
Both textually and in practice the international legal system is moving towards 
a clearly defined democratic entitlement, with national governance validated 
by international standards and instruments and systematic monitoring of 
compliance.16
This approach is strengthened by the inclusion of the Commonwealth 
(Latimer House) Principles as an integral part of the ‘Affirmation of 
Commonwealth Values and Principles’ by Heads of Government meeting in 
Trinidad and Tobago in 2009. As we shall see, the Principles are also embodied 
in the Commonwealth Charter of 2013.17
13 Dale (n 1) 48–51. Dale had been legal adviser in the Commonwealth Office when it was 
a separate department of state in the United Kingdom government.
14 Ibid.
15 Peter Slinn, ‘The Commonwealth and the Law’ in Mayal, op cit, pp 32–34.
16 Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (OUP 1995) 139, 
quoted in Slinn (n 15).
17 Available at <http://thecommonwealth.org/our-charter> accessed 20 November 2018.
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iii) Monitoring of compliance
The ‘systematic monitoring of compliance’ has proved problematic as far as the 
Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles are concerned. The original 1998 
Guidelines envisaged that:
[I]f these Guidelines are adopted, an effective monitoring procedure, which 
might include a Standing Committee, should be devised under which all 
Commonwealth jurisdictions accept an obligation to report on their compliance 
with these Guidelines…. Considerations of these reports should form a regular 
part of the meetings of Law Ministers and Heads of Government.18
Whilst the CMJA, CLA and CLEA have tried to establish their own monitoring 
mechanism and other Commonwealth-accredited organisations have called for 
some form of evaluation of the implementation of Commonwealth fundamental 
values,19 funding has proved elusive to date for such a venture. The Principles, as 
they emerged at Abuja, from the process of refinement, contain no reference to 
such procedures, merely stating that the objective is:
…[T]o provide, in accordance with the laws and customs of each 
Commonwealth country, an effective framework for the implementation by 
governments, parliaments and judiciaries of the Commonwealth’s fundamental 
values.20
In 2005, a forum of representatives from all eighteen African Commonwealth 
countries organised by the Commonwealth Secretariat led to the production of a 
Plan of Action for Africa (The Nairobi Plan of Action for Africa) on the 
implementation of the Principles. This was adopted in revised form for the 
Commonwealth as a whole at a colloquium held in Edinburgh in 2008. These plans 
of action urged governments to establish mechanisms to monitor and evaluate their 
implementation in their respective jurisdictions. Whilst the Nairobi Plan of Action 
for Africa was endorsed by governments, this was not the case with the Edinburgh 
18 Guideline IX ‘Measures for Implementation and Monitoring Compliance’, Secretariat 
text, p 23 <www.cmja.org> accessed 20 November 2018.
19 ‘Democracy in the Commonwealth: A report on Democracy 18 years after the Harare 
Declaration’ produced for Electoral Reform International (ERIS) and the Commonwealth 
Policy Studies Unit (CPSU) 2009 by Kwadwo Afari Gyan, Asma Jahangir and Tim 
Sheehy.
20 See booklet (n 8) 10.
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Plan of Action and no mechanism for evaluating the implementation was 
established.21
However, the question of the implementation of the Principles has remained 
on the agenda of Commonwealth Law Ministers. In 2011, Commonwealth Law 
Ministers adopted recommendations from a Rule of Law Expert Group to 
encourage Heads of Government to give better effect to them.22 In yet another 
report commissioned by Heads of Government, an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) 
considered means of strengthening the core values of the Commonwealth. The 
EPG recommended the appointment of a Commonwealth Commissioner for 
Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights and the adoption of a Charter for the 
Commonwealth encapsulating in a single document the principles embodied in the 
Singapore and subsequent declarations and statements. The Commissioner 
proposal foundered on the unwillingness of governments and of the then Secretary 
General to accept an independent monitoring mechanism of any kind. 
However, the Charter proposal did find favour. After much amendment of the 
original draft appended to the EPG report by Michael Kirby, a distinguished 
former Australian High Court judge, the Charter was adopted in 2012 and formally 
signed in March by the Head of the Commonwealth.23 However, this Charter is 
not a legal instrument binding on member states. It is a declaration by ‘We the 
people of the Commonwealth’ of the core values and principles of the organisation, 
including those of Latimer House. Perhaps not surprisingly, there are no references 
to any monitoring or enforcement mechanisms and the Charter appears to be 
aspirational in nature rather than prescriptive.
It might appear that a decisive step had been taken to ensure the implementation 
of the Commonwealth’s fundamental values at the Auckland CHOGM in 1995 by 
the establishment of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) which 
comprised a rotating group of nine ministers of foreign affairs, i.e. a governmental 
peer review mechanism. As noted above, CMAG has proved of limited effectiveness 
except where a complete breakdown of constitutional governance has occurred. 
However, in 2011 CMAG, as a watchdog protecting the Commonwealth fundamental 
values, moved from considering only military or coup-led attacks against democracy, 
to dealing with ‘serious or persistent violations of Commonwealth fundamental 
political values that do not involve an unconstitutional overthrow of a democratically 
21 Ibid 47.
22 Communiqué of the Commonwealth Law Ministers Meeting, Sydney, Australia 2011.
23 The text of the Charter was presented to the British parliament as a command paper in 
March, 2013, Cm 8572. Commonwealth Accredited Organisations were given the 
opportunity to make submissions and the Latimer House Working Group made a 
submission which was to some extent reflected in the text.
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elected government’. CMAG recognised that the Commonwealth had ‘added 
important principles to those contained in the Harare Declaration such as the 
Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles’, so that CMAG now had a mandate to 
invoke breaches of the Principles in calling a government to account for serious or 
persistent violations of Commonwealth fundamental values.24
The difficulties posed by a CMAG intervention on this basis may be illustrated 
by the example of the Maldives. In September 2016, the Maldives government 
was given six months by CMAG to address concerns including the detention and 
prosecution of opposition leaders, interference with the judiciary and undermining 
of democratic institutions. The response of the Maldives Government was to 
leave the Commonwealth, alleging that it had been treated unjustly and unfairly 
by CMAG, and that the Maldives were being targeted by CMAG and the 
Commonwealth Secretariat ‘in the name of democratic promotion, to increase 
the Commonwealth’s own relevance and leverage in international politics’. All 
the Commonwealth Secretary General could do was to express her ‘sadness and 
disappointment’.25
4. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION: THE CASE 
OF THE JUDICIARY
Aside from cases referred to CMAG, there has been persistent evidence of breaches 
of the Commonwealth’s fundamental values in jurisdictions which have never 
experienced military rule and which ostensibly maintained a democratic system 
under the rule of law. As discussed below, it has been left to the Latimer House 
Group, working outside of government through the ‘green channel’, to draw 
attention to these breaches and attempt to hold governments to account. Upholding 
the independence of the judiciary provides an important case study.
In a number of instances the independence and personal safety of judicial 
officers and parliamentarians has been threatened. For example, a military take-
over in Pakistan led to the judges being required to take a new oath of office or 
face dismissal. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, in dealing with a 
constitutional challenge to the military take-over, vigorously asserted the 
independence of the judiciary. However, it found that the conduct of the deposed 
24 Strengthening the Role of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) 
Report by CMAG adopted by the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 2011 
(Commonwealth Secretariat).
25 A succinct account of the withdrawal and reaction thereto can be found in Michael 
Safi, ‘Maldives Quits Commonwealth over Alleged Rights Abuses’ (The Guardian online 
13 October 2016).
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democratically elected government had been such in terms of corruption, 
mismanagement and abuse of the independence of the judiciary and the rule of 
law as to justify the military intervention under the doctrine of necessity. However, 
after the restoration of civilian rule and of the dismissed judges, the Supreme 
Court nullified the earlier judgment and ruled the military take-over unlawful.26 
In 2018, the political situation in Pakistan remains volatile. However, the election 
of the leader of the opposition as Prime Minister through a largely peaceful 
transition may mark a departure from the habitual chaos and violence of Pakistani 
politics.27
In some countries, such as Australia, the separation of the judiciary from 
legislative and executive powers and the separation of the judicial officers from 
political activity have been rigorously maintained. In other countries where the 
system is based on the Westminster model, checks and balances against abuse of 
power may not be as effective as in those countries which have enshrined the 
principle of constitutional supremacy so all actions of the organs of the state have to 
conform to the Constitution as the supreme law. An independent, honest and 
impartial judiciary is integral to upholding the rule of law, engendering public 
confidence and dispensing justice. In a number of Commonwealth countries despite 
the well-intentioned provisions in the Constitutions which provide for equality of 
opportunity, appointment on merit and the removal of gender and other historical 
discriminations, appointments are subject to the whims of the Executive. 
The Principles outline the requirements of all Commonwealth countries to 
have in place a system where:
a. Judicial appointments should be made on the basis of clearly defined criteria 
and by a publicly declared process. The process should ensure:
• equality of opportunity for all who are eligible for judicial office;
• appointment on merit; and
• that appropriate consideration is given to the need for the progressive 
attainment of gender equity and the removal of other historic factors of 
discrimination;
b. Arrangements for appropriate security of tenure and protection of levels of 
remuneration must be in place;
c. Adequate resources should be provided for the judicial system to operate 
26 Khan v Musharaf [2008] 4 LRC 157; Sindh High Court Bar Association v Pakistan 
[2010] 2 LRC 319.
27 Imran Khan, the former international cricketer was elected in August 2018. See also 
Interim Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group on the Pakistan Election July 2018 
(available on the Commonwealth Secretariat Website).
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effectively without any undue constraints which may hamper the independence 
sought;
d. Interaction, if any, between the executive and the judiciary should not 
compromise judicial independence.
Well-established parliamentary procedures for the removal of judges exist in 
all Commonwealth Constitutions. However, these mainly affect judicial officers in 
the higher courts although even then some countries have disregarded the 
constitutional or parliamentary process. Magistrates and District Court judges 
may not benefit from the same security of tenure and can often be removed by a 
simple decision made by the Attorney General as happened in The Gambia under 
the Jammeh regime. This issue was highlighted at the 2018 Triennial Conference 
of the CMJA which adopted the Brisbane Declaration on the Independence and 
Integrity of Judicial Officers of the Lower Courts.28
Even the perception that there may not be security of tenure may require a 
change in the system of appointment. This was demonstrated in Scotland following 
the judgment in the Starrs v Procurator Fiscal (Linlithgow)29 where it was 
successfully contended (citing what were then the Latimer House Guidelines) that 
the existing system of appointment of temporary Sheriffs brought into question 
their independence. As a result of this judgment, the system of appointing Sheriffs 
was radically changed and there are no longer any temporary Sheriffs in Scotland. 
In other cases where judicial officers do not benefit from constitutional protection, 
the same individual rights under article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights should apply to them.30
It is recognised that parliaments are primarily responsible for law-making. In 
some Commonwealth countries the judiciary has been charged with ‘judicial 
activism’ especially in the area of human rights where since 198831 judicial 
officers have increasingly made reference to norms established by international 
28 Available on the CMJA website (n 18).
29 Linlithgow (n 9). 
30 Article 10 provides that ‘Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing 
by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of [their] rights and 
obligations and of any criminal charge against [them]’.
31 The Judicial Colloquium on the Domestic Application of International Norms held in 
Bangalore, India, concluded inter alia that: ‘It is within the proper nature of the judicial 
process and well-established judicial functions for national courts to have regard to 
international obligations which a country undertakes – whether or not they have been 
incorporated into domestic law – for the purpose of removing ambiguity or uncertainty 
from national Constitutions, legislation or common law’.
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treaties for the purpose of deciding cases where domestic common law is 
ambiguous. This is inevitable in a world which has been progressively moving 
towards globalisation. However, judicial officers remain sensitive to the fact that it 
is parliament that has primacy in the law-making process and that they are 
accountable to the Constitution and to the law. In most cases where this has 
happened, the country may have already signed and/or ratified an international 
convention but not integrated the international norms into domestic law. Article II 
of the Commonwealth Principles states: 
a. Relations between parliament and the judiciary should be governed by respect 
for parliament’s primary responsibility for law making on the one hand and for 
the judiciary’s responsibility for the interpretation and application of the law 
on the other hand.
b. Judiciaries and parliaments should fulfil their respective but critical roles 
in the promotion of the rule of law in a complementary and constructive 
manner.
As the third pillar of democracy, the judiciary cannot operate without 
resources. In a number of instances, funding has been cut to the judiciary (whether 
through limitation of salaries, non-repair of court buildings or reduction of budgets 
for improving access to justice and similar projects) in order to exert influence 
over judicial officers who may not be toeing the executive line. Sufficient and 
sustainable funding needs to be provided to the judiciary so that it can perform its 
functions. It is recognised that shortfalls in national incomes have to be taken into 
account in all budgets. However, parliaments which are responsible for agreeing 
national budgets must ensure provision of adequate resources to the judiciary so 
that they can ‘operate effectively without any undue constraints which may hamper 
the independence sought’.32
5. TOWARDS IMPLEMENTING THE COMMONWEALTH 
PRINCIPLES
A number of Commonwealth countries are already making progress in 
implementing the Commonwealth Principles. In the United Kingdom where the 
separation of the judiciary from the legislative and executive has been in modern 
times a strong convention of the Constitution, the major constitutional reforms 
enacted in 2005 removed perceived anomalies which appeared at variance with 
the principles embodied in the Latimer House Guidelines. For example, the Lord 
32 Article IV(c) of the Principles. 
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Chancellor is now merely a government minister (and not necessarily a lawyer!), 
having lost both legislative and judicial roles. The Judicial Committee of the 
House of Lords was replaced with a Supreme Court, separated institutionally and 
physically from Parliament. Further, the informal system of judicial appointments 
has been replaced by a process involving a Judicial Appointments Commission.33 
The United Kingdom can now be considered formally in compliance with the 
Commonwealth Principles. As an example of good practice, the Australian Capital 
Territory legislature commissioned an audit of the implementation of the Principles 
in the territory.34 Sadly, this audit precedent has not been followed in other 
jurisdictions.
The Commonwealth Principles are now firmly entrenched in the fundamental 
political values of the Commonwealth. However, given the refusal of 
Commonwealth governments to accept any formal monitoring mechanism (such 
as the Rule of Law Commissioner proposed by the EPG high-level review and the 
failure of CMAG to carry out its full mandate), the four sponsoring organisation 
have been left with the task of holding member states to account for any alleged 
breaches of the Principles. They have contributed to the development of tools to 
ensure best practice such as the Benchbooks for Legislatures produced by the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association35 and the Guide for the Magistrate in 
the Commonwealth: Fundamental Principles and Recommended Practices which 
was produced by the CMJA in 2017. They have also undertaken training for 
parliamentarians, lawyers and judicial officers and provided regular confidential 
briefings to meetings of Commonwealth law ministers and senior officials. In 
addition, the CLA, CLEA and CMJA have produced joint statements drawing 
public and official attention to such breaches. Joint statements in the form of press 
releases have been issued, inter alia, in relation to the impeachment of the Chief 
Justice of Sri Lanka, the forced removal and deportation of a Magistrate from 
Nauru, the removal of three judges in Zambia, the threat of impeachment of judges 
in Botswana, the arrest and detention of lawyers and judges in the Cameroon, 
executive threats against the judiciary in Kenya and threats to the position of the 
Chief Justices of Lesotho and the Seychelles.36 The effect of these statements is 
hard to assess. The intervention may have contributed to the restoration of the 
33 For a succinct summary of the 2005 reforms, see David McClean, ‘Judicial Reform in 
the United Kingdom’ (2005) 16(1) Commonwealth Judicial Journal 25.
34 Report of the ACT Legislature 2009: available at <https://www.parliament.act.gov.
au/_data/assets/pdf_file/0003/690213/2015-02-ACT-Report-on-the-Latimer-Principles.
pdf> accessed 20 November 2018.
35 See the website of the CPA at <www.cpa.org> accessed 20 November 2018.
36 The full texts of all these statements are available on the CMJA website: see n 18.
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impeached Chief Justice of Sri Lanka after a change of government in 2015 even 
though she promptly resigned her position. Also regarding the Seychelles, a report 
of a fact-finding mission by the Southern African Chief Justices Forum relies on 
the Principles and the Guidelines in relation to judicial accountability and judicial 
security of tenure.37
The Commonwealth Principles and the role of an independent media
The Principles closely follow the Guidelines in the issues that are considered 
paramount to a modern democracy, including the role of an independent media 
which can promote government accountability as well as the role of other 
independent bodies whose role it is to scrutinise and oversee the integrity of the 
Executive’s activities. 
Article IX states:
a. Steps which may be taken to encourage public sector accountability include: 
The establishment of scrutiny bodies and mechanisms to oversee Government 
enhances public confidence in the integrity and acceptability of government’s 
activities. Independent bodies such as Public Accounts Committees, 
Ombudsmen, Human Rights Commissions, Auditors-General, Anti-
corruption commissions, Information Commissioners and similar oversight 
institutions can play a key role in enhancing public awareness of good 
governance and rule of law issues. Governments are encouraged to establish 
or enhance appropriate oversight bodies in accordance with national 
circumstances. Government’s transparency and accountability is promoted 
by an independent and vibrant media which is responsible, objective and 
impartial and which is protected by law in its freedom to report and comment 
upon public affairs.
The bodies referred to in article IX are essential in maintaining public 
confidence and awareness of the rule of law. They are also the front line in fighting 
against corruption, one of the priorities of Commonwealth countries seeking to 
develop economically. It is a well-proven fact that economic development requires 
a strong, effective, and transparent legal system. Foreign investment is not 
forthcoming without such the structures in place. The Principles urge the 
promotion of ‘zero-tolerance’ for corruption as being vital to good governance. 
37 Report of the Southern African Chief Justices Forum on the fact-finding mission to the 
Republic of Seychelles, June 2018, available at <https://sacjforum.org> accessed 5 
September 2018.
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In 2018, an ad hoc working group convened by the Commonwealth Journalists 
Association and including representatives of the CLA, CLEA and CPA adopted 
the ‘Commonwealth Principles on Freedom of Expression and the Role of the 
Media in Good Governance’ in what was a conscious imitation of the development 
of the Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles.38 The promoters of these 
principles hope that they too will be embodied in some form by Heads of 
Government as part of the Commonwealth’s fundamental values.
6. CONCLUSION AND OVERVIEW
The Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles call for judiciaries and parliaments 
to ‘fulfill their respective but critical roles’ for otherwise this can severely impact 
on the good administration of justice. The Edinburgh Plan of Action noted that 
‘each new generation of government officers, parliamentarians, lawyers, judicial 
officers and members of civil society has to be alert to the imperatives of, and 
balance between, the independence and accountability of the judiciary, parliament 
and the executive…’.39 Most problems which arise in the Commonwealth derive 
from a continued lack of understanding of each institution’s role in the governance 
process. The Edinburgh Plan of Action also called for more regular awareness 
training, on appointment or election, of parliamentarians, judicial officers and 
public servants on basic constitutional principles and the primary roles of each 
pillar of democracy in the constitutional process. 
In 2013, the Commonwealth Secretariat commissioned the CLA, CLEA, 
CMJA and CPA to develop a ‘Latimer House Toolkit’ to enhance the dialogue 
between the three pillars of democracy whilst not compromising their 
independence. Published in 2015, the four associations are still waiting in 2018 to 
assist the Commonwealth Secretariat to roll out of this toolkit in order to promote 
better respect between the three organs of the state in order to ensure that ‘each 
Commonwealth country’s Parliaments, Executives and Judiciaries are the 
guarantors in their respective spheres of the rule of law, the promotion and 
protection of fundamental human rights and the entrenchment of good governance 
38 ‘The development of these principles has been inspired by the example of the Latimer 
House Principles’: Commonwealth Principles on Freedom of Expression and the Role of 
the Media in Good Governance, Introduction p 3. The Principles <https://commonwealth.
sas.ac.uk/sites/default/files/files/Publications/Commonwealth%20principles%20on%20
freedom%20of%20expression%20and%20the%20role%20of%20the%20media%20in%20
good%20governance.pdf> accessed 5 September 2018.
39 Note (4) of the Edinburgh Plan of Action for the Development, Promotion and 
Implementation of the Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles (2008), booklet p 40.
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based on the highest standards of honesty, probity and accountability’. In this, the 
Associations derive comfort from paragraph 13 of the CHOGM communiqué of 
April 2018:
Heads reaffirmed their commitment to the Commonwealth (Latimer House) 
Principles on the Accountability and the Relationship between the Three 
Branches of Government (2003) as an integral part of the Commonwealth’s 
fundamental political values. Heads requested the Commonwealth Secretariat 
work in partnership with other Commonwealth organisations in promoting 
dialogue between the three branches of government, including through the full 
application of the Latimer House Toolkit, which provides a practical guide to 
enhancing the separation of powers.40
Thus the Latimer House process, twenty years on, is in Bourne’s words, ‘a 
spectacular example of the impact of Commonwealth associations on 
intergovernmental policy’.41 The Principles thus must be seen as a commitment to 
the core Commonwealth values and as a benchmark by which the performance of 
all Commonwealth countries should be judged.
40 The Toolkit, a comprehensive set of guidance in a number of volumes, with illustrative 
case-law from the Law Reports of the Commonwealth, Lexis-Nexis, 1985 to date, was 
published by the Commonwealth Secretariat in 2015 <http://thecommonwealth.org/key-
reform-area/57> accessed 20 November 2018.
41 Bourne (n 12).
